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V.-THE IDEA OF THE STATE.
BY C. DELISTJE BtTBKS.
TUB philosophical interpretation of the state depends chiefly
upon an analysis which penetrateb under the forms of ad-
ministration. It will find in those forms the embodiments
or expressions of ideas and feelings ; and it will, therefore,
be, in part, a psychology and, in part, a moral evaluation of
the comparative worth or importance of popular conceptions
and passiona But the analysis should be carried further.
We must penetrate beneath the psychological facts and the
moral quality of this or that generation in order to discover,
if possible, the governing tendency of which the ideas of
administrators and the vaguer conceptions of the populace
are the surface currents. For there is a tendency, like a tide
underlying the ripples and eddies of the hour, which carries
us through centuries and is, more truly than any political
habit, the "idea" of the state.1 This tendency is to be
analysed and estimated. It is not to be conceived as a
conscious plan: nor is it a blind and unhuman dan. It is
not a permanent and continuous movement, but should be
compared rather to a succession of momentary illuminations
or periodic impulses, setting in a certain common direction.
It is a rational tendency in that it is made up of flashes of
intelligent insight into what is possible or desirable; but it
is not rational, if by rational is meant argumentative or
syllogistic.
The analysis of this " idea" of the state shows, among
other important facts, that the state exists for bringing men
together, for unifying or co-ordinating their action for common
purposes. The particular common purposes for which the
state exists, usually called political, are order and liberty, the
fundamental conditions for the successful pursuit of all other
social purposes. But clearly an organisation which exists
for one purpose may be used for the attainment of other
'It will be seen that we mean by the "idea" of the state not the
Aristotelian tmireisal bat the Platonic idea, corrected so as to include a
reference to change. Perhaps this may be the Aristotelian TA W jr tlrau
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THB IDEA OF THE STATE. 189
purposes as well. Thus a Trade Union, existing for the
betterment of the industrial position of its own members,
may be used also as an instrument for the general intellectual
improvement of the whole wage-earning class. And so we
find the state used sometimes as the foundation of a Church,
or to provide an administrative system in education. The
fundamental purpose remains, order and liberty, to dis-
tinguish the idea of the state: and with this purpose go
various necessary means, which therefore enter into the idea
of the state,—administration, legislation, and other such
devices of organisation.
We shall not, however, analyse all the elements of the idea
of the state, but shall confine our attention to one element in
the idea which has been insufficiently analysed in political
philosophy. It is that part of state life and state action
which is concerned with the relation between states. Tnis
does not appear so far to have sufficiently affected the philo-
sophical interpretation of the state; and the problems of
allegiance and of responsibility in this regard have been only
very crudely treated by philosophers. We take this, then,
as our main thesis : the idea of t/ie state implies that the state
exists for increating the intercourse and interdependence be-
tween its own citizens and those of every other state.
As a preliminary we must note that the important fact
is not that there are in existence many states, but that
there is a connexion between these states of a definite and an-
alysable kind. We do not wish to call attention to the fact,
for example, that the ' ' idea" of a heart or a brain must be
derived from the study of many hearts or brains, but to the
fact that the idea of the heart must be derived from a study
of the relation of a heart to a lung or a limb. It is true that
the nature of the state has been studied too much by each
philosopher as though the particular state which he inhabited
were the only or the most typical state. But the other poin^ t
is more important for us here, namely, that the connexion
between states has been dismissed too summarily in discussions
as to the nature of the state.1 Again, many men seem to be
able to study or think out the structure or activities of this or
that foreign state : but a knowledge of a foreign state which
1
 Thus the argument does not refer to the " olaas-coneept" state and ifa*
source. No one denies that Hegel, for example, knew that "state " was
• class-name applicable to many specimens. The argument no far as the
" authorities " go was briefly snmmarued in my paper in the ArxttoUlian
Society t Proc4edingt for 1916-16, p. 290. Bat in that paper the evidence
from state life, which matt be the basU for any theory ns to the " idea "
of the state, was only briefly reviewed.
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190 C. DELISLE BURNS :
is an " inside" knowledge, in the sense in which the popular
knowledge of our own state is, will not avail for our purpose
here. A knowledge of each state separately is not a know-
ledge of the relations between states ; and these latter are the
evidence to which we refer in saying that the nature of the
state is affected by its foreign relations.
It is generally agreed that, so far as its own citizens or
subjects are concerned, the state exists to bring them to-
gether : but the present view was not always and everywhere
held to be true. Machiavelli and others believed that the
Prince or King in France, representing the state, did well in
setting the people against the nobles. And it is implied in
the idea of the balance of powers in Polybius and perhaps in
Montesquieu that the state is an equilibrium of contending
forces. Only by the wildest metaphor can this be called a
bringing together or unification of citizens and subjects.
The principle "divide et impera" has been adopted by
political philosophers as valid and has been practised, as
effective, by politicians and rulers. But against this we set
the contrary opinion that the state exists for bringing men
together; and we find that most political philosophers are of
this opinion. The majority, however, think of " men " as
citizens of the particular state they choose to discuss. For
neither political theorists nor politicians have yet accepted
the idea that the state exists for bringing together men of
different states. We shall omit, therefore, the problem of the
relation of the state to the groups of its own citizens and
subjects, and concentrate our attention upon what are called
the foreign relations of the state. We shall maintain that
the idea of the state implies that the state exists for bringing
together, unifying the interests and the action of, the citizens
and subjects of different states.
We may summarily assert that this is the opinion or the
implied conception of Plato in the Laws, of Petrus de Bosco,
of William of Ockhain, of Grotius, Locke, Kant and T. H.
Green. The opposite conception, that the state marks the
distinction and emphasises the difference between citizens
and aliens, is the implied opinion in Aristotle, Thomaa
Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel and Bluntschli. It
does not appear to be possible to commit to either opinion
such writers as Seneca, Augustine, Dante, Bodin, Vattel, and
Lotze. Those philosophers who are not greatly concerned
with social theory need not be classified: minor writers,
sometimes vigorous influences, such as Paine, may be cited
by both sides ; and we may omit entirely the opinions of
sentimentalists such as Ruskin or Rudolf Eucken. It should
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THE IDEA OF THE STATE. 191
be understood, however, that the above names are given
merely to indicate roughly the distinction of opinion of which
we are thinking. It does not in the least affect the problem
that " authorities " can be found on either side: and obviously
it is utterly unimportant for our present purpose if any of the
writers we have named has been wrongly classified. We
omit the problem of commentary and interpretation : quite
possibly Hegel understood the external relations of the state,
although to our mind his language may seem to show him
entirely ignorant of certain important facts. We must, how-
ever, now return to the problem itself. How far does the
idea of the state imply the promotion by the state of the
interests which are common to its own citizens and to aliens?
Analysing the general tendency in the history of the state
we find that the evidence against our thesis may be summar-
ised under two heads : (1) militarism and (2) the concentration
upon domestic development in every state. As for ihe first,
it is held that the state is essentially an offensive-defensive
organisation against non-citizens, because the greatest ex-
penditure in most states is given to armaments, the whole
history of external policy is a record of wars and preparation
for wars, and nearly every state compels most of the male
population to practise killing. Further, militarism is not
merely a preparation for war: it is a social situation in which
the majority learn obedience without responsibility for their
own acts and the few acquire authority by bearing the burden
of decision as to what others shall do. This is held to pro-
duce order and organisation: for " to organise" means, in
popular parlance, to make each man do what some other man
thinks he ought to do. But since the state exists for order,
militarism is in the idea of the state and so is the justification
of militarism, the division and conflict between states. The
conception here summarised can be more persuasively ex-
pressed in the terms of rhetoric or of that kindly " philosophy
of the spirit" in the mists of which all clear outline is lost.
It is to be read in Hegel and Treitschke; and, in disagreeably
clearer terms, in Hobbes. From this it follows that the idea
of the state implies that the state keeps off or excludes aliens
from contact with its own citizens : or that, if contact occurs,
it is a danger and an unfortunate political accident.
Secondly, it is held that because every state has been more
carefully developed internally the external relations of the
state cannot be of any importance to the idea of the state.
Very little time or thought has been given to changing or
modifying the relations between states: and in fact these re-
lations are now not very different from what they were in
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192 C, DELI8LE BUBNS:
ancient Assyria, in Greece or in the Middle Ages. The state
seems, therefore, to be like an organism within a hard and
exclusive shell, within which alone its development shows its
nature. The ideal would be a self-sufficing, isolated state;
although, because the earth is so overcrowded, no state may
embody that ideal. It may be argued also that the fact that
states have grown in size and in internal complexity and yet
have not abolished war and the preparation for war shows
that the real tendency is towards no external change but a
more inclusive and self-sufficing whole. This is the philoso-
phical conception, if any, which underlies Naumann's Mittel-
Europa and the policy of large "blocks" such as were
indicated in the Paris Conference.1
We reply as follows: War and militarism are not in the
" idea "• of the state, because (a) war and militarism are
survivals from the period before there was a state. The or-
ganisation of nomadic tribes is modified or even controlled by
militarism. The head-hunters of Borneo understand and
maintain militarism, but not political administration. The
patriarchal family is often militarist But what can be found
so frequently where no state exists cannot be in the " idea "
of the state. All the virtues and excellences which Hegel
finds in the military class or " spirit" in the state can be
found in groups which are innocent of state-life.
Again, militarism is not in the idea of the state because (b)
the general tendency of state-development has been towards
an always widening distribution of responsibility among the
members of the state. This is sometimes called democratisa-
tion : but in any case it is clear that more and more citizens
tend to take over or to accept the moral responsibility for the
actions of their state and to bear the political responsibility, in
the sense that they are eager to claim the right to risk their
own happiness by depending on their own judgment It is
undeniable that the tendency of state life is towards refusing
to rulers or administrators the power to make decisions
without being criticised. Kingship with its sacredness and
its "responsibility only to God " is fast disappearing; and it
will clearly be followed into oblivion by the idea of concen-
trating judgment and administrative decisions in a small
group.
Finally (c) the undeniably great effects of militarism upon
state-organisation (the amounts paid for army and navy,
spying or secret service, nationalistic education, etc.) are no
'Rousseau points oat that the larger states become the more terrible
wars are. So that all the internal organisation seems to make only mor*
efleotire the attempts to destroy all organised life.
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THE IDEA OP THK STATE. 193
proof that these effects are of the essence of the state, but
only evidence that the idea of the state is not yet enongh
developed for as to shake off devices and habits which were
useful or necessary in a pre-political world In the same way,
the world of industry shows everywhere immense wealth of
a few co-existing with degrading poverty of the many. But
this is not of the essence of industry. It is a survival from
barbaric chaos. It is true that war is not simply a bad habit
but an institution,—an institution with political connexions
so universal that if it could be eliminated the whole structure
of political society might be changed : but, even so, it is not
essential to the structure, as cancer and tubercle are not
Bssential to the body.
As for the concentration upon domestic development, this
would only prove that one element in the idea of the state
had been appreciated more fully than another. At most it is
a negative indication with regard to external relations of the
state; and that it does not prove the idea of the state to be
the separation of the interests of citizens and aliens will be
shown when we come to the positive evidence in favour of
our thesis. It is, indeed, sometimes said that the spiritual
world in which a fully developed man lives has no organisa-
tion beyond his own state ; l and this is perhaps connected
with regarding the state as the highest embodiment of a
Charity Organisation Society: but this also may be replied
to in the positive proof of the contrary conception: That con-
centration on domestic issues is not an exclusion of change
in external contact is indicated by the change in the nature of
a frontier. In old times the frontier of a state was a barrier,
a waste, an interval beyond which another state existed. At'
present a frontier is often only an administrative division, as
between Canada and the United States, and it is always a line
of contact. There are no waste " marches " except the sea.
Analysis of the history of the state shows that (1) the
common interests of its own citizens and subjects, for which
most men agree that the state exists, can only be secured if
the state also aims at the interests whicb are common to
citizens and aliens; (2) there is an increasing impatience as
state-life develops with the divisions and differences between
governments and still more impatience with the militarism
and periodic wars which delay domestic reform or obstruct
ordinary conveniences; (3) there is a rapidly developing
organisation of the external relations of states on political
(non-military) principles. Such indications imply that one
1
 Cf. Boeanquet in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1916-17.
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194 C. DBLISLE BUHNS :
element in the idea of the state if> interstate political organisa*
tion. First, to the most simple minds it is clear that order
cannot be secure within a state unless it is secure also in
coterminous states. This idea was used as an excuse for the
intervention of Austria in Serbia and of Great Britain in
the Transvaal. The action taken destroyed rather than
promoted order ; but the aim was order outside the frontiers
of the state. The same kind of idea was used to support the
United 8tates' war against Spain in Cuba. We may, how-
ever, omit the discussion of the methods used ; for our point
is that every state is concerned in the promotion of order and
liberty outside its own frontiers, even for the sake of the
interests of its own citizens or subjects and quite apart from a
general support of the principles of justice. Again, the state is
concerned with the suppression of crime and disease; but
crime of the most anti-social kind and epidemic disease are
independent of state frontiers. Each state, therefore, can
only Derform its functions for its own citizens adequately by
organising its relations and co-operating with all other states.
Cholera was only subdued in Europe when the states of
Europe acted together: the "white slave" traffic is only
controlled in so far as there is agreed common action between
states. It follows that it is of the essence of the organisation
for order and liberty that it should imply a co-operation
not only between its own members but also between all
these and those who are not its members. If the state is
conceived as a relation between certain human beings, who
are citizens or subjects, it must also be conceived as relating
all these to non-citizens or aliens. The state is " for " and
looks towards inter-state political organisation; without
which as a state it is embryonic or primitive, since it cannot
at all adequately perform the functions for which it exists.
States differ in territory, in number and kind of inhabitants,
in methods of administration and legislation ; and none is
completely organised until the relation of each with the other
is organised. Each is unable to perform its fullest and best
function until it is interrelated organically with every other,
as the limb of the body cannot be perfect unless it is organi-
cally connected with all other limbs of the same body.
Secondly, the impatience felt by the more highly developed
citizens, when war or the preparation for war interferes with
political development or with activities dependent upon such
development, is a sign that the underlying tendency of state-
life is towards the elimination of war. What has been
achieved by the state is the ground and reason for the im-
patience at war or militarism; the state, therefore, is itself
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THB IDEA OF THE STATE. 195
committed to the results of the tendency, from which indeed
the state itself arose, and of which the present state is a par-
tial embodiment But the elimination of war is a mere
negative. The tendency we refer to implies in the place of
military relations between states, not no relation, but a
political relation.
We do not assert that there is any common consciousness
of a need for inter-state political organisation. But we
assert that there is, and has been for some time past, a
general tendency to regard war and the preparation for war
as a nuisance and an interference with civilised life. This
was not always so. In mediaeval times war was accepted
much more generally as in " the nature of things " ; and in
the aristocratic philosophy which remains to us from the
Greek tradition, war is implied as slavery is implied to be a
necessary element in the structure or life of society.
With this impatience we may connect the " economic
mind " of modern times ; for political theory and practice are
much more consciously economic in their tendencies than
they were in mediaeval times. With respect to the relation
between states it may be held that commerce is an instru-
ment of policy by which a state can obtain advantages over
its rivals, the other states. The other aspect of the same
theory is that the state exists to promote the commerce of its
citizens, to the disadvantage of tne commerce of aliens. We
omit the consideration of the economic errors involved in
regarding (1) the quantity of commerce as static, so that
what one gains another loses, and (2) the sale of goods as a
gain to one party only in the sale. The political theory im-
plied in the above conception of state action is that the state
exists for promoting the economic wealth of a small group of
its citizens and that administration is better if it controls a
larger number of persons or a more extensive territory. Only
on such grounds could one argue that the state exists to over-
come other states commercially. And in opposition to this we
say that men are increasingly impatient of state quarrels aris-
ing out of economic rivalry. No such quarrel can ever be main-
tamed without a belief that the real reason for the quarrel is
a distinction of moral ideals. For the tendency is to suppose
that the state supports civilised hfe and civilised life depends
more and more upon reserves of goods drawn from all quar-
ters of the earth. The economics of the world market
demands the conception of the state as essentially promoting
amicable relations with all other states.
The third proof of our thesis is the formation of inter-state
political organisation. The facts are sufficiently well known
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and we need not describe the various commercial Treaties
and Conventions (which provide interstate legislation) and the
various offices, the Postal Union, etc. (which provide inter-
state administration). We pass to the philosophical interpre-
tation of these/in so far as it affects tho idea of the state.
Clearly such legislation and administration is an embodiment
of the political spirit, if we may use that metaphor. The
organised community to which a citizen belongs iB, therefore,
not to be identified with his own state; and the state is not,
even in the purely political realm, a complete whole. The
average man is not yet, perhaps, emotionally stirred by the
new conception of the state or t>y those activities of the state
which, being newer, promise more for tb • future. Tha com-
monplace politician is still troubled by the myth of nation-
ality—Britannia, la France or Deutschland; and he is still
obsessed by the narrowest interpretation of sovereignty.
But already a. change is occurring in the popular mind and,
in any case, the commitments of men, driven by necessity,
have outrun their imagination: the state is organically re-
lated to other states. This does not invalidate the conception
of the sovereignty of the state in its strict sense, as final
authority for its own citizens. And the new conception will
not make the state less worthy of allegiance or affection : for
men may serve with great devotion an institution which they
know to be only part of a whole. As an instance we may
cite the devotion of its members, the Jesuits, to thfl Society of
Jesus. But a devotion to the State as a part, or limb, in a
greater body will probably correct the insane chauvinism
which sometimes is to be found eveu in the apparently
reasoned statements of professed philosophers.
We do not argue that the formation of a world-state or
even of a world-federation of states is implied in the develop-
ment of the idea of the state. These older forms of political
life are inadequate to express the new situation. Inter-state
organisation has produced a new type of political relations;
and it is this new type which we find to be implied in the
idea of the state, when we consider its external relations.
This new type of organisation is of practical importance for
all citizens, whether or not it results in a League of Nations.
But philosophy should not lag behind. The tradition of
Rousseau and Kant should not be forgotten ; and the philo-
sophy of to-day should be able to pierce to the underlying
tendency which shows the true nature of state life. The
particular element in state-life, the inter-state relation, to
which we have referred, will provide some evidence for deal-
ing with other wsuee too long neglected by political philo-
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sophers as, for example, the relation of state-loyalty to Trade
Unionism or to certain forms of Christianity, the limits,of
the moral responsibility of state-agents for their action, and
other problemK. All these problems are greatly modified if
the nature of the state involves co-operation with and not
opposition to other states. And indeed the whole question ol
the moral obligation involved in citizenship will be transformed
if we no longer regard any particular state with that mystic
adoration which is implied in the Hegelian philosophy.
It may not be seemly in the serene groves of philosophy to
make too pointed an application of philosophical principles
to current events : but we may point out some general con-
sequences which would follow from the acceptance of our
idea of the state. First, it would follow that, if the state may
demand military service because of the evils it has inherited
from pre-politicai life, the state may and should repress the
impulses, speeches and actions which maintain* or create
division and hostility between states in times of peace. The
method of repression may be subtle and indirect: it certainly
could not be punitive or vindictive: but it is implied in the
idea of the state above described that bellicosity in time of
peace is a crime. Secondly, it would follow that the highest
service of the state is not defending the state from others bat
promoting directly the inter-state organisation for common
purposes of citizens and aliens. Thirdly, it would follow that
much thought and imagination need to be given to the de-
velopment of that element in the idea of the state which we
have emphasised in this essay. Fourthly, the state is not a
" summum genus " in political categories, still less is it so in
general social theory. Fifthly, philosophers should perhaps
read blue-books, dispatches and " social documents," before
attempting to compose commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.
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